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Introduction
During the last two decades, municipalities have experienced increased financial
pressure hastened by urbanization, demographic changes, technological
advances and the proliferation of federal and state mandates as well as declining
intergovernmental revenue. Local governments, faced with citizen demands to
do more with less, are continually seeking ways to economize and make more
efficient their operations. In the midst of taxpayer revolts, a century-old debate
regarding the best form of government continues as some municipalities
consider whether a change in their form of government is able to provide the
sought efficiencies. This paper assesses the relative performance of the councilmanager versus the two predominant political models of government in
Connecticut: Mayor-Council and Selectman forms of government. All three will
be assessed in terms of their capability to provide for greater efficiency in
Connecticut’s municipalities. To our knowledge, no study of this type has been
made which includes the comparative performance of the Selectman form of
government. While this question has been explored in other states and localities,
there is a dearth of empirical data on Connecticut.
Connecticut municipalities display widely varying financial performance
capabilities.

To explain such variation, we consider several plausible

explanations including 1) form of government, 2) demographic characteristics
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such as population size and wealth and 3) fiscal factors. This study draws from
2005 data collected on Connecticut municipalities by the Connecticut Economic
Resource Center and uses a statistical model to perform a comparative analysis.
Financial performance will be primarily measured in terms of property taxes,
bond rates, total expenditures and the grand list. The findings of this study are
potentially generalizable throughout the New England region with its shared
history and local government structures.
Literature Review
The debate regarding the optimal structure of municipal government has
been explored in numerous scholarly works dating back to the Progressive era
when reformers prescribed a new model for good governance (Knott and Miler
1987, Nalbandian 1991). Citing the pervasive corruption associated with urban
political machines governed by the strong-mayor form of government at the turn
of the 20th century, the reformers set out to separate politics from administration
and create a form of government based on “neutral competence.” Among the
reforms, the council-manager provided for an elected city council with a
professionally trained manager to administer various municipal departments.
Freed from political constraints and daily pressures of having to pacify various
political constituencies prevalent in the strong mayor model, the professional
manager could ideally make decisions based on economy and efficiency.
The relative merits of both models have been argued at length by their
proponents. Embedded in each type of government structure are choices about
dominant values that are exhibited to varying degrees in all three forms:
representativeness, nonpartisan technical competence and executive leadership
(Aronson and Schwartz 1994). The intrinsic values of the political model called
upon this form of government as providing for the most responsiveness towards
citizens, inherently beneficial in a democracy. Adherents of the strong mayor
form of government cite its ability to incorporate a variety of demands
particularly from ethnic groups prevalent in urban centers. Cost efficiency was a
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secondary if not remote consideration of these administrations. But neutral
competence obliges professional managers to contain costs and often gives them
a freer hand to make policy decisions since they are not beholden to political
constituencies such as unions, business interests, and racial and ethnic groups.
Moving beyond the conventional arguments which are presented in a
dichotomous fashion, .i.e. politics versus administration, Deno and Mehay (1987)
explore the notion that both manager and mayor forms of government have
incentives to promote efficiency as both seek to be responsive to the median
voter. The manager, hired by the elected council and serving at the pleasure of
this body, is often expected to provide professional policy advice and run
operations efficiently. The manager’s job performance centers on efficiency and
productivity achievements (Hayes and Chang, 1990). The mayor, concerned
with reelection, also must seek to satisfy voters by holding the line on taxes or
risk being punished at the polls. However, unlike managers, mayors also are
subject to countervailing pressures that militate against efficiency, such as
satisfying various political constituencies which tend to drive government costs.
The connection between efficiency and structure of government is not
simply an academic debate. Encountering the optimal structural arrangement
for performance has been an ongoing concern of citizens who demand greater
efficiency from their government. Home rule municipalities are empowered to
change their form of government when citizen discontent reaches a critical mass.
The quest for the optimal form of government is often viewed as a panacea for
inefficiencies. Citizens often make informal assessments of how one or another
form of government will deliver the promised for benefits when initiating charter
reforms. The underlying dynamics of municipal reform is outside the scope of
our inquiry. However, it should be noted that several Connecticut municipalities
have recently undergone charter revisions; some moving to the council-manager
form of government and in the case of the city of Stratford a reversion back from
the council–manager to the strong mayor form of government.
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Institutional Performance and Municipalities
Institutional performance has become a key consideration at all levels of
government. With the advent of the Government Performance and Results Act
in federal government have come trickle down effects to states and localities.
Devolution has also spurred academic interest in municipalities an often
overlooked level of government. One such project, the Government Performance
Project based at the Maxwell School for Public Affairs provides ratings for state
and local governments based on five key systems of government management:
financial, capital management, human resources management, information
technology management and managing for results. The results of this study are
published in an annual scorecard published by Governing magazine and has
provided the impetus for some municipalities to improve their managerial
capabilities. Another example of the popular concern for municipal performance
is the annual issue rating Connecticut town’s found in Connecticut magazine.
While there are a number of dimensions along which government
performance can be measured, a heightened concern for efficiency has taken a
central place in debate among scholars and practitioners. The authors examine
performance in terms of efficiency; carrying out in the least costly manner the
provision of government services. Fiscal efficiency as a measure of municipal
performance has been explored elsewhere. Lineberry and Fowler (1967) found
that reform governments lead to lower levels of taxing and spending. In a study
examining the differences between city managers and strong mayor cities,
Stumm and Corrigan found a strong correlation between cities with professional
managers and lower property taxes and expenditures (1998). They found that
cities with professional management achieve measurable efficiencies compared
to cities without such management. The authors measured efficiency in terms of
reduced levels of municipal expenditures and property taxes. This study seeks
to expand upon their findings by focusing exclusively on municipalities in

35

The New England Journal of Political Science

Connecticut. In addition, this study also will examine bond ratings to determine
which form of government achieved greater overall levels of financial health.
Structure of Connecticut’s Municipalities
Connecticut is often referred to as the land of steady habits. The reference,
while somewhat pejorative, is telling of much of the inertia and glacial pace of
change seen in government institutions. Nowhere is this more marked than at
the level of municipal government which bears the same contours and structures
inherited from colonial New England.

This is evidenced by the fact that few

municipalities employ the council-manager form of government.

Yet, the

growing realization that tradition may sacrifice a certain degree of efficiency has
prompted some municipalities to add a managerial position without jettisoning
the traditional town meeting form of government. Many smaller municipalities
governed by the Selectman form of government begun to add a Town Manager
position to administer municipal departments. In Connecticut, the three major
forms of government are in use by municipalities are depicted in the table below.
Table 1
Forms of Municipal Government in Connecticut
Selectman-Town Meeting

102

Selectman-RTM

7

Mayor-Council

30

Council-Manager

30

Total

169

CERC, 2005
Mayor-Council
The Mayor-Council form of government is utilized in approximately
thirty municipalities in Connecticut. It is generally found in small and large
cities and large towns.

This form of government, with its emphasis on
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representativeness, consists of one top elected official, the Mayor, with an elected
legislated body in the form of a Council or Board of Aldermen. The mayor
provides policy leadership and executive management, including the hiring and
firing of department heads.
Council-Manager
The Council-Manager form of government arose during the Progressive
Reform era of the early 1900s to exclude politics and bring greater efficiency to
local government. It consists of a full-time paid professional referred to as the
City or Town Manager who is hired by the council to be the chief executive
officer. In this form of government, the council serves the legislative function and
appoints a manger who selects department heads and directs their activities. It is
the most prevalent form of United States municipal government. As anticipated
by Knoke’s (1982) thesis regarding the spatial-temporal diffusion of municipal
innovations, municipalities in Connecticut that have adopted the councilmanager form of government tend to be clustered around the Hartford area.
Selectmen-Town Meeting
While relatively few municipalities in the United States are governed by
this form of government, the vast majority of municipalities in Connecticut
utilize a Selectmen-Town Meeting form of government which dates back to the
colonial era.

In this form of government, the legislative body is the

representative town meeting. In a representative town meeting (RTM) where
voters select a limited number of citizens to represent them at town meetings and
vote on the budget. Additionally, the Board of Selectmen is a multi-member
body ranging in number from three to five members and is responsible for
executive decision-making. Day to day authority is given to the First Selectman
who is the chief executive officer. This form of government, with its plural
executive, diffuses authority between the selectmen and the boards and
commissions that oversee various departments.
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As Connecticut’s municipalities towns grow and change, they have
adopted incremental strategies to meet challenges without abandoning the town
meeting form of government. The shortcomings of the town meeting form of
government with its emphasis on representativeness over managerial capabilities
has prompted many municipalities in New England to hire professional
managers to perform the day- to-day operations of town government. Even
smaller and rural municipalities governed by the Selectmen-Town meeting also
display an increasing concern to augment their managerial capabilities. The
changes have taken a variety of forms such including the creation of a chief
administrative officer in the form of an administrative assistant, town manager,
or executive administrator to provide professional support to the Board of
Selectmen.

In Mayor-Council forms of government the trend towards

professionalization has taken the form of a chief administrative officer (Hansell
2002, Svara 2002 and DeSantis and Rennner 2002.
Municipal Finance in Connecticut: Dynamics and Modalities
In Connecticut, reliance on local property tax to fund the lion’s share of
municipal expenditures has placed tremendous pressure on citizens. Concerns
about proposed educational finance reform and its implications for municipal
finance have prompted calls for a property tax cap. No where is the pressure
more felt than on municipal chief executives. Municipalities in Connecticut
display varying levels of fiscal efficiency. Citizens in one locality experience
routine increases in mill rates while others reside in municipalities that have held
the line on property taxes. Citizens often question why one municipality with
similar demographic characteristics manages to contain property taxes while a
neighboring municipality experiences steady increases.

Accounting for such

variation will comprise the first portion of the empirical analysis
Another dimension of financial efficiency is captured by a town’s bond
rating. Many towns in Connecticut issue bonds to finance long term capital
improvements. A bond rating by one of the rating agencies serves to assess the
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credit quality of the municipality and determines the rate the issuer will pay on
the debt. A municipal bond rating is a relative measure of risk to bondholders as
well as a measure of financial strength which takes into consideration all of the
resources of an issuer and the legal structure of the financing.

Connecticut

municipalities receive their bond rating from Moody’s Investors Service which
uses economic, debt, administrative and financial performance criteria.
Hypothesis and Empirical Methodology
The question of whether a manager form of government is associated with
better performance than a mayor-council or selectman form of government is an
empirical one that cannot be unambiguously established, ex ante. In part, this
difficulty may reflect the fact that performance can be inherently subjective; it
may range from the onerous nature of comparatively higher taxes to a gauge of
arguably inadequate level of services, to difficult-to-quantify intangibles
reflecting a town’s quality-of-life attributes.
Given these manifold considerations, a researcher appraising performance
can opt for one of two approaches. She can limit the inquiry, remove oneself
from the semantic constraint and focus on one aspect of performance.

For

example, an examination limited to financial performance would require largely
financial variables. Clearly, the results of such a narrow inquiry are limited in
their generality; it would be impossible to conclude whether observed
outstanding financial performance did not benefit from interrelated but possibly
intangible factors such as attractive cultural events or the presence of many parks
and recreational activities.
Alternatively, a researcher can construct a composite metric, drawing on
increasingly popular data reduction methods such as factor analysis or principal
components to construct a performance index that would aggregate the
information content of a town’s financial variables and qualitative elements.
Although they command their own store of limitations, indices tend to capture
the broader aspects of what is commonly understood as performance.
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We use a town’s bond rating as a proxy for performance. Municipal bond
ratings are intended to provide investors with a guide to the relative investment
quality of bond issues and thereby entail a composite measure of the financial
strength of a township, city, county, schools or special districts. Municipalities
issue two types of bonds, for the most part: general obligation bonds and
revenue bonds. General obligation bonds are issued to finance a wide variety of
municipal operations and repayment of debt is from taxation and other general
revenue sources. The bonds are guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the
local government issuing the bond. Revenue bonds are issued to raise funds to
finance specific projects, for the most part long-term capital projects and public
improvement projects.

Repayment of revenue bonds is from revenue derived

from the investment.
The precise nature of the bond rating process is known only to the
agencies. Although raters focus primarily on financial variables, they
systematically take into account all of the resources of the issuer, debt levels and
debt structure, the legal structure of the financing and also intangibles such as
leadership quality and management ability. It is not clear what weight financial
variables command in the ratings process let alone how the intangible variables
are quantified and the relevance, or weight, they are given.
Because it bodes well for someone appraising the likelihood of debt
repayment, it appears to us that a bond rater is more likely to attach more
favorable rankings to communities with a comparatively more efficient delivery
of services, where efficiency is gauged as cost per unit of service delivered. Thus,
to the extent that better performance is associated with a less costly provision of
the services required by a community then increased performance is positively
associated with favorable bond ratings. Previous empirical efforts examining the
relationship between form of government and performance are inconclusive.
Hayes and Chang (1990) examine expenditures for police, fire and garbage for
191 cities and find no significant difference in the expenditure levels for these
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functions between managers and mayor-council cities. Stumm & Corrigan (1998)
on the other hand, find a clear positive association between the manager form of
government and several fiscal variables.
The Empirical Model
The empirical modeling approach is driven by particular features of the
variables in the data set.

First, because the dependent variable of interest,

Moody’s Bond rankings, takes on ten ordered values, we use an estimator for
ordered outcomes. Ordered regression models produces coefficients that
represent the effect of each independent variable net of all other included
independent variables, as well as standard errors associated with these
coefficients that allow for hypothesis testing. Ordered regression recognizes the
ordinal nature of the dependent variable without assuming that the differences
between one (bond) rating and the next are of uniform size across the variable’s
entire range. Parameters estimating the effect of independent variables on the
dependent variable taking on a successively greater value are calculated using
maximum likelihood techniques (see Winship and Mare 1984; Wooldridge 2000)
and are readily generated with most commercial statistical software packages.
The analysis presented was performed using Stata 9.0.
The second consideration is a sample selection problem. Table 2 contains
a tabulation of the various bond ratings in the data set. Out of the 169 townships
for which we have data, 18 do not report a bond rating. This omission may be a
result of the fact that a non-reporting town has not had any reason to use bond
financing; its level of services can be adequately met by tax revenues.
Alternatively, the town may have failed to report a bond rating because the
particular town may have anticipated not drawing a favorable rating and
therefore it either did not solicit one or it decided not to issue the bond.
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Table 2
Observations per Bond Rating
Bond
Rating

Frequency

Percent

Cumm

A1

41

24.3%

24.3%

A2

20

11.8%

36.1%

A3

30

17.8%

53.8%

Aa1

8

4.7%

58.6%

Aa2

13

7.7%

66.3%

Aa3

22

13.0%

79.3%

Aaa

12

7.1%

86.4%

Baa1

4

2.4%

88.8%

Baa3

1

0.6%

89.3%

NA

18

10.7%

100.0%

Total

169

100.0%

Thus, the dependant variable, bond ratings, is not always observed. We
must therefore proffer a selection equation that determines whether a town
makes it into the examination sample.

The equation consists of a binary

dependent variable set to 1 if a town has issued a bond and 0 if it has not. An
examination of variables suggests that most small towns, characterized by
smaller populations and appropriately less extensive levels of services, are less
likely to issue bonds. Thus, we propose to identify those towns that do have
bond ratings by using population as the selection variable.

Linear predictions

based on the estimated coefficients of the selection model allow us to construct
the inverse mills ratio, f(Zi)/(1-f(Zi)), the ratio of the normal density and the
normal cumulative probability function.
The mill ratio then enters the ordered regression model as an explanatory
variable. This two-step treatment ensures that the probability of a bond issue is
not necessarily established by the same set of variables used to distinguish the
relationship between a particular form of government and bond rating (Sigelman
and Lee 1999; Grier, Munger & Roberts 1994).
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Accordingly, we can specify the empirical model as follows:
zi* = β1 X1i + ε1i
B

P

PB

B

B

B

B

B

(1)
B

(2)

ri* = β2X2i + µ2i
B

yi = m
B

B

PB

P

B

B

B

B

B

B

if τm-1 ≤ yi* < τm for m = 1 to J
B

B

B

PB

P

B

B

Equation 1 is the sample selection equation where zi* is an unobserved
B

PB

P

variable, the likelihood of a bond issue. We do not observe this variable but do
observe an indicator variable zi that equals 1 if zi > 0 and equals 0 otherwise.
B

B

B

B

Equation 2 is an ordinal regression model that represents an underlying latent
variable, r,* ranging from -∞ to +∞.

The measurement model for ordinal

outcomes divides r* into J ordinal categories where the thresholds τ1 through τJ-1
B

B

B

B

are estimated.
Thus, our selection procedure establishes the probability of a bond issues
based on the size of a towns population using a probit model.
Prob(Bond Issue) = φ(level of services)
The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a
town reports a bond rating and a 0 otherwise.

We use an ordered probit

estimator; the inverse mills ratio drawn from the selection process enters the
ratings equation.

We use data on the reported level of reported township

expenditures as a proxy for the level of services; the reported expenditures
variable is entered in logarithms.
Our ordered probit specification is presented in algebraic terms:
Performance =
φ(Manager, Population, mill rate,taxes, Industrial/commercial share of
grand list ,per capita income, Inverse Mill Ratio)
Performance is a town’s Moody’s Bond rating. Our variable of interest is
Manager, a binary variable accounting for the presence of a manager type of
government (Manager = 1) versus a non-manager (Manager = 0) type of
government.

The non-manager type of government – for which the binary

variable is set to 0 - encompasses various political models typically found in use
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by Connecticut’s municipalities.

The expected sign depends on the relative

influence of the various interest groups in a township. We attempt to control for
the relative influence of the business and commercial groups, unions and the
population at large.

Share is a variable that represents a town’s

Commercial/Industrial share of a township’s grand list; thus we would expect
this variable to be positively associated with bond ratings.

The variable

Population represents a township or municipalities’ reported population in 200#.
The variable Mill rate represents a town’s fiscal burden; specifically the mill rate
is the property tax valuation multiplier reported rate in 2002. The variable Taxes
represents a town’s per capita tax as a percent of state average. Per capita income
represents a town’s reported income per person and is considered a proxy for the
wealth of the community. The Inverse Mill ratio: is the ratio of the normal density
and the normal cumulative probability function, f(Zi)/(1-f(Zi)), derived from the
selection equation.
Data and Data Treatment
Data was obtained from data collected on Connecticut municipalities by
the Connecticut Economic Resource Center (2005).

The bond rating variable

was converted into an ordinal scale whereby higher ratings are associated with
higher numbers; this facilitates interpretation. The variables for population, per
capita income, per capita expenditures, share, mill rate and taxes were
transformed into logarithms prior to its use in a regression to minimize
heteroskedasticity.
We report the results for the ordered probit model without correcting for
selectivity bias and the result for the Heckit procedure correcting for selectivity.
The results of the selectivity model binomial probit can be found in an appendix
to this paper.
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Table 3
Ordered Probit Regression Results
Dependent Variable:

bond rating
Ordered

Independent Variable

Probit

Heckit

Manager

0.742

0.662

(3.15)*

(2.23*)

-2.67

-2.37

(-5.76)**

(-5.28*)

-0.039

-0.087

-0.33

-0.61

2.923

2.59

(7.03*)

(7.28*)

-0.688

-0.139

(-5.64)**

(-0.76)

Mill Rate

Industrial/Commercial Share
of Grand List

log tax (as a % of state
average)

log per capita income

Mills Ratio

4.316
(4.03**)

Observations

147

166

Absolute value of z statistics in parenthesis
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

The proposed hypothesis of the manager model is confirmed by the
ordered probit analysis for the selectivity bias corrected model as well as for the
uncorrected one. The dummy variable for the manager form of government
confirms highly statistically significant and positive relationship to Bond ratings.
There are some inherent caveats about our general conclusion imputed by
the Heckit procedure.

The success of the sample selection bias procedure

depends greatly on correctly specifying the selection model. The selection model
is relatively parsimonious.
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Concluding Comments and Future Research
When the concern is over performance, there are strong arguments in
support and equally compelling critical counterarguments for both the mayorcouncil, and the manager form of government – especially among municipalities
in Connecticut.

Thus, the resolution of this controversy must clearly be

empirical.
We find statistical support showing the manager form of government as
being positively associated with higher municipal bond ratings and confirm the
findings of Stumm & Corrigan (1998). Bond ratings offer a viable aggregate
measure of not only a town’s ability to service its debt but any number of other
elements that reflect the presence of efficient mechanisms in the delivery of
services. The positive association between a manager form of government and
higher bond ratings would confirm the hypothesis that managers are better able
to exert financial control due to their relative freedom from political
considerations and their primary emphasis on efficiency as a result of their
professional training and orientation.
Other possible explanations that require further analysis may be found in
the form of institutional constraints such as the budget referendum. In towns
which utilize a referendum, citizen concerns over taxes may act as a powerful
check on expenditures. The relative weight of this factor has yet to be explored
and may, in combination with professional managerial control, may contribute to
higher financial performance as measured by bond ratings.
As we addressed earlier in our paper, performance encompasses multiple
dimensions.

Although finances are arguably among the most important

considerations for a municipality, performance can be measured using a variety
of factors such as education, the depth and breadth of services offered by a
municipality including leisure and cultural activities. A future research agenda
includes analyzing these other dimensions of municipal performance.
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Finally, a major question, which is tacitly raised by our findings but lies
outside the scope of this inquiry, is the issue of municipal reform and innovation.
Given its apparent superiority in handling municipal finances, why is it the case
that so few municipalities in Connecticut employ the council-manager form of
government? A future research agenda includes an analysis of the dynamics
underlying municipal reform as well as barriers to change. We can speculate
that some possible explanations that militate against municipal reform are the
strong traditions of local control that are embodied in the selectman and mayor
forms of government.

In instances where charter revision processes have

generated proposals to alter the basic form of government and its attendant
power structure, entrenched interests have often risen up to oppose the adoption
of a professional manager.
At every level of government, the heightened concern for performance
and accountability has prompted a number of managerial innovations designed
to bring greater efficiency to administration. The issues raised in this concluding
section will comprise a future research agenda that examines municipal
performance in Connecticut with implications for municipalities throughout
New England.
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Table 4
Moody’s Public Finance Ratings
Rating

Investment
Grade

Long-Term

Quality

Aaa

Strongest Creditworthiness

Aa1/Aa2/Aa3

Strong Creditworthiness
Above-average

A1/A2/A3

Creditworthiness

Baa1/Baa2/Baa3

Average Creditworthiness
Below Average

Below
Investment

Ba1/Ba2/Ba3/B1/B2/B3

Creditworthiness

Grade

Caa1/Caa2/Caa3

Very Weak Creditworthiness

source: Moody's Investors Service

Table 5
Descriptive Statistics

Variable

Mean

Std Dev

Population

20931

25048

Household Income

70662

22969.55

Per Capita Income

10.4

12.3

Total Expenditures

50900000

67300000

Expenditures

2369

428.9

Mill Rate (2002)

28.05

7.09

103.5

33.9

(2001)

11.2

7.29

SAT Scores

1031.8

79.8

Total Per Capita

Per Capita Tax (as a
percent of state average)
Commercial/Industrial
Share of Grand List
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Table 6
Correlation Matrix of Continuous Variables

Per
Capita
Income

Total Per
Capita
Expenditures

Mill
Rate
(2002)

Per
Capita
Tax (as
a
percent
of state
average)

Variable

Population

Population

1.00

Per Capita Income

-0.47

1.00

0.12
0.45

0.08
-0.16

1.00
-0.09

1.00

-0.14

0.25

0.75

-0.35

1.00

0.61
-0.43

-0.53
0.22

-0.08
0.17

0.27
-0.35

-0.26
0.39

Total Per Capita
Expenditures
Mill Rate (2002)
Per Capita Tax (as a
percent of state
average)
Commercial/Industrial
Share of Grand List
(2001)
SAT Scores

Table 7
Results of Probit Selection Model

Dependent: bond issue

Coefficient

Log Expenditures

0.709
(4.33)**

Constant

-10.613
(3.96)**

Observations

170

Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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(2001)

SAT
Scores

1.00
-0.30
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